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INTRODUCTION
An English woman moves from her home in Cyprus back to
England, taking her fourteen-year-old daughter from a first marriage,
and a six-year-old son from her second (current) marriage with her,
without the knowledge of her current husband. The current husband and
father of the son then seeks the return of both children back to Cyprus,
invoking his rights under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction (Hague Convention), concluded under the
auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.' After it
becomes evident that the daughter was unhappy in Cyprus and would
* Research Consultant, Security Council Report, and member of legal teams in
several interstate disputes. LL.B. in Law, History and Jewish History, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, 2008; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 2010. The author would like to
thank Professor Ryan Goodman for his very helpful insights and guidance.
1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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refuse to return, the mother claims that both children must remain with
her in England; for if the court rules that her son must be returned to
Cyprus, she would be forced to choose between staying with her daugh-
ter in England and accompanying her son to Cyprus. This "impossible"
situation before the English courts' reflects the tough decisions that
judges are routinely faced with when deciding whether a child should be
returned to his or her place of habitual residence in cases of international
child abductions under the Hague Convention.
Aside from the return, the abduction itself can have devastating ef-
fects on the child, not to mention on the left-behind parent.' The latter
may experience emotional hardship, and encounter practical difficulties
in finding and retrieving the child.! The removed child, in turn, is often
abruptly torn from his or her familiar surroundings and experiences the
trauma of being cut off from the left-behind parent.! The child may also
witness the ugly legal scuffle between his or her parents, and experience
being routinely hidden from the authorities during his or her abduction.'
Parents who take their child to a foreign country without the consent
of the other parent, thus exposing him or her to such hardships, differ in
their characteristics and motives. Still, a couple of generalities can be
stated. Statistical analysis suggests, for instance, that most abductions
are engineered by the primary caretakers, who are usually the mothers.
Similarly, statistics show that more often than not, the removing parent is
"returning home," and taking the child to the parent's own country of
nationality.
Despite these generalities, abductors vary in their motives. For ex-
ample, some wish to flee threats and violence, acting in the child's best
interests.9 Others resort to kidnapping due to feelings of "homesickness"
felt for their home country. Some use abduction in order to inflict pain
2. In Re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Physical or Psychological Harm), [1999] 2
F.L.R. 478 (A.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
3. NIGEL LOWE, INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION: HAGUE




7. NIGEL LOWE ET AL., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2003
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 21-23 (2006), Prel. Doc. No. 3, Part 1 (2007 update) (prepared by
Nigel Lowe) [hereinafter LOWE ET AL., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS].
8. Id. at 23.
9. See Miranda Kaye, The Hague Convention and the Flight from Domestic Violence:
How Women and Children Are Being Returned by Coach and Four, 13 INT'L J.L. POL'Y &
FAM. 191, 192 (1999); Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from
Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 637-39 (2000) [hereinafter Weiner, Domestic
Violence].
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upon their partner."o Still others might remove the child as a legal tactic,
presuming that an ensuing custody hearing in a different jurisdiction-
perhaps a jurisdiction where they have former ties-might work to their
advantage." Still, some of these removing parents, like many left-behind
parents, are simply unaware that an international treaty to combat cross-
border child abduction exists at all." Thus, while the possible character
and motives of abducting parents are diverse, the effects mentioned
above follow from an abduction more often than not.
The Hague Convention aims to deter future abductors and demon-
strate mutual respect for the laws of its member states, while presumably
serving the best interests of the child." It operates as a jurisdictional
mechanism by reinstating the status quo prior to the removal through the
prompt return of the child to his or her place of habitual residence.14 This
return, as clearly stated in the Hague Convention itself, bears no effect
on the merits of any existing or future custody dispute between the par-
ents." The Hague Convention demands that contracting states respect
past or future decisions pertaining to custody decided in the place of ha-
bitual residence." Though the Hague Convention essentially solves
matters of private international law (i.e., questions of proper forum and
choice of law)," domestic courts retain discretion to deny return on sev-
eral technical and substantive grounds." These exceptions to return,
provided for in the Hague Convention, necessitate a limited examination
by courts of the relationships among both parents and the abducted child.
10. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. McELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON IN-
TERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 10 (1999) (referring to the "homesickness" of the abducting
caretaker as motive for abduction); Melissa S. Wills, Interpreting the Hague Convention on
International Child Abduction: Why American Courts Need to Reconcile the Rights of Non-
Custodial Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted Children, and the Underlying Objectives of
the Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG. 423, 428 (2006) (referring to the wish to inflict pain
and suffering on the abductor's partner).
11. ANDREW BAINHAM, CHILDREN: THE MODERN LAW 750 (3d ed. 2005); see also
B.D. INGLIS, NEW ZEALAND FAMILY LAW IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY 536-37 (2007).
12. LOWE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
13. See generally Elisa Pdrez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child
Abduction Convention, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (discussing
the Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session, Vol. IHI, 1980); BAINHAM, supra note 11,
at 750; INGLIS, supra note 11, at 539, 543.
14. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; Pdrez-Vera, supra note 13, It 16-17, 19,
24, 35; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750; INGLIS, supra note 11, at 536-37, 544-47; Abbott v.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1989 (2010).
15. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 19; Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d
Cir. 1999); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
16. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; Perez-Vera, supra note 13, 1 16-17, 19,
24, 35; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750; INGLIS, supra note 11, at 536-37, 544-47; see also
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1989.
17. See INGLIS, supra note 11, at 539-40.
18. See infra Part II.A.4.
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In recent years, however, courts-and the majority of scholars writ-
ing on the issue-have questioned the narrow framework in which they
are obliged to operate when deciding whether to return a child. They
have looked at how adjudication proceedings under the Hague Conven-
tion coincide with human rights regimes, with a particular focus on the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).' 9 As will be discussed,
more and more writers have opined that in order to satisfy the obliga-
tions of the CRC, courts must expand the narrowly construed exceptions
to an order of return.
This Article will examine whether these assertions have merit and
whether an adjustment of the Hague Convention and the courts' applica-
tion of it is required in order for states to comply with their human rights
obligations. The starting point for this assessment will be an explanation
of the basic premises and content of the Hague Convention and the CRC.
Thus, Part I will present the basic contours of these two legal regimes.
Part II will then present and analyze several of the arguments claiming
that the Hague Convention is at odds with a proper understanding of
human rights obligations, particularly as expressed by the CRC.20 It will
then counter these arguments, based on an analysis of the interaction
between the two international treaties. Part III will discuss the best inter-
ests of a distinct category of flesh-and-bone children: those children
statistically prone to be abducted in a given year. The discussion of the
rights of these children leads to the conclusion reached at the end of Part
III, that the Hague Convention's content and application is not at odds
with the CRC.2'
19. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC]; see also discussion infra Part II.
20. Part II.A.4 deals with issues related to gender violence. These issues, by their na-
ture, initially raise questions relating to the abducting mother's rights rather than those of the
child. As these issues often give rise to human rights concerns regarding the application of
Hague Convention, they will also be analyzed.
21. Before proceeding, it should be noted that this Article is concerned with the norma-
tive question of the interaction between two legal regimes as a matter of principle. How any
specific case should be decided in its unique factual setting is beyond the scope of this work.
The normative framework analyzed in this Article, though, is of course intended to provide
guidance for judges and practitioners confronted with real cases and to influence the academic
debate on the topic.
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I. THE RELEVANT CONVENTIONS: COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND
CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION
A. The Hague Convention and Its Application
The Hague Convention was drafted in 1980 under the auspices of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. It was drafted against
22
the backdrop of the growing phenomenon of interstate child abduction,
in an age when divorce is increasingly more common and the ease of
interstate travel has lifted many impediments to interstate marriages.23
The drafters of the Hague Convention sought to deal with this reality by
creating a mechanism for cooperation between the judicial and adminis-
trative branches of the parties to the Convention, in order to promote the
swift return of children taken from-or unreturned to-their place of
habitual residence. This mechanism recognizes past decisions in foreign
jurisdictions and allows for future decisions of local authorities in those
jurisdictions regarding the custody and future of abducted children. 24
This mechanism demonstrates mutual respect for the laws of the member
states, and endeavors to deter those parents who may otherwise attempt
to take the law into their own hands. 25 Currently, eighty-two states are
parties to the Hague Convention, making it a relatively effective interna-
tional treaty.26
Article 3 determines the scope of application of the Hague Conven-
tion:
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered
wrongful where-
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the
law of the State in which the child was habitually resident im-
mediately before the removal or retention .... 2
The article states that when a child is taken and not returned to his or
her place of habitual residence (i.e., abducted in violation of the custody
rights of the other parent as set out by the courts in the state of
22. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 13, 1 24; LowE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
23. LowE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
24. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; Pdrez-Vera, supra note 13, at 16-17, 19,
24, 35; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750; INGLIS, supra note II, at 536-37, 544-47; see also
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1989 (2010).
25. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 13, 1t 13-15, 18, 19; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750; ING-
LIS, supra note 11, at 539, 544.
26. Hague Convention, supra note 1, Status Thl. (last updated Apr. 6, 2010).
27. Id. art. 3.
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residence), the forum is obligated to order the child's return to the place
from where he or she was removed, without delay.
A child is deeply affected by being removed from his or her habitual
residence and taken to another location imposed on him or her by the
abducting parent. 28 Although the best interests of the child are not found
explicitly in the operative clauses of the Hague Convention, the pream-
ble states that it seeks "to protect children internationally from the
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention" and that the par-
ties are "firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount
importance in matters relating to their custody."29 As Elisa Prez-Vera
concludes, "[ilt is thus legitimate to assert that the two objects of the
Convention-the one preventive, the other designed to secure the imme-
diate reintegration of the child into its habitual environment-both
correspond to a specific idea of what constitutes the 'best interests of the
child."o
As such, one of the basic principles underlying the Hague Conven-
tion is the swiftness of the child's return in order to minimize the impact
of the abduction on the child." The Hague Convention implies that re-
turn proceedings should not extend longer than six weeks.2 For this
reason, a court tasked with a request for return under the Hague Conven-
tion must only consider, in a prompt and expedited manner, the most
"essential issues" and facts it needs reach a decision on the request for
return of the child."
For the Hague Convention to operate properly, each party must es-
tablish a "Central Authority," responsible for the cooperation needed to
secure the objects and purposes of the Hague Convention in its state.'
Among its specific functions, the Central Authority in the child's place
of habitual residence or in any other contracting state, accepts and proc-
esses applications from parents alleging the abduction of their child."
The Central Authority then initiates proceedings for the return of the
child to his or her place of habitual residence. A parent alleging abduc-
tion of his or her child still maintains the right to bypass the Central
Authority and pursue the return of the child by his or her own means.
28. Prez-Vera, supra note 13, 24.
29. Hague Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.; Prez-Vera, supra note 13, 1 23.
30. Pdtez-Vera, supra note 13, 125.
31. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 2; Pfrez-Vera, supra note 13, 36; INGLIS,
supra note 11, at 537-39; LOWE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
32. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 11; INGLIS, supra note 11, at 537.
33. INGLIS, supra note I1, at 539, 542.
34. Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. II; Pdrez-Vera, supra note 13, 190; INGLIS,
supra note 11, at 538.
35. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 8.
36. See id. art. 7(f).
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There are a number of exceptions to the general rule that abducted
children must be returned that take into account the best interests of the
abducted child.17 If established, these exceptions grant the forum discre-
tion-though not a duty-not to return the child to his or her place of
residence." The relevant exemptions are found in Articles 12, 13, and 20
of the Hague Convention. Article 12 reads as follows:
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms
of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the pro-
ceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the
Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one
year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or reten-
tion, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child
forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceed-
ings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of
one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order
the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is
now settled in its new environment. 9
This article stipulates that in proceedings commenced within a year
of the wrongful removal, the child is to be returned without discretion
(unless another exception to return exists). However, when more than a
year has elapsed, the court has discretion to override the presumption of
return if it finds that the child is settled in his or her new environment.
Thus, the Hague Convention recognizes that there comes a point in time
when a child should not be removed from his or her surroundings for the
second time, regardless of the wrongfulness of the initial abduction.
The most common exceptions to return are argued in accordance
with Article 13 of the Hague Convention:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the ju-
dicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not
bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or
other body which opposes its return establishes that-
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the
person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights
37. Pfrez-Vera, supra note 13 125.
38. Id. 113.
39. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
40. BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 760; INGLIS, supra note 11, at 598.
41. LOWE ET AL., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 37.
517Spring 2011]1
Michigan Journal of International Law
at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or sub-
sequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order
the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which
it is appropriate to take account of its views.42
The meaning of a "grave risk" and the issue of a child's objection to re-
turn will be thoroughly discussed later.
Finally, Article 20 refers directly to denial of return where matters of
human rights-as recognized in the domestic legal system of the re-
quested state-are concerned. 4 3 As explained by Elisa Nrez-Vera, the
discretion to refuse return under this exception-again, not the duty to
do so-if it would violate international human rights, pertains only to
those rights that have been incorporated and internalized into the domes-
tic legal system of the requested state.4 Consequently, this article does
not provide a basis to deny return on the conclusion that such a return is
41
at odds with locally unincorporated international human rights norms.
It is widely accepted by national courts applying the Hague Conven-
tion that its objects and purposes necessitate a narrow interpretation of
these exceptions.46 This ensures an internationally consistent interpreta-
tion of the Hague Convention, which will help achieve its goals.47 For
this reason, courts in member states commonly take the approach that
42. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 13.
43. Id. art. 20.
44. Pdrez-Vera, supra note 13, at 462, 118.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 434-35, 34; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750; INGLIS, supra note 11, at
538, 545, 579; see also Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999); Friedrich v. Frie-
drich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996); In re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psychological
Harm), [1999] 1 F.L.R. 1145 (A.C.) (Eng.).
47. P6rez-Vera, supra note 13, 1 34. In the words of Nrez-Vera:
The practical application of this principle requires that the signatory States be con-
vinced that they belong, despite their differences, to the same legal community
within which the authorities of each State acknowledge that the authorities of one
of them-those of the child's habitual residence-are in principle best placed to
decide upon questions of custody and access. As a result, a systematic invocation of
the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the
child's residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the Conven-
tion by depriving it of the spirit of mutual confidence which is its inspiration.
Id.
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only in unusual circumstances will the best interests of the child dictate a
finding that the child should not be returned.48 For example, not all dan-
gers posed to the child in the place of habitual residence will lead courts
to conclude that return is unwarranted; rather, a very high threshold of
danger must be reached before finding that a child should not be re-
turned.49 Similarly, courts will place the burden of proof to establish an
exemption from return on the abducting parent. Thus, the burden is on
the parent who, in the eyes of the court, is attempting to enjoy the fruits
of violating the custody laws of the child's state of habitual residence.o
B. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
Approximately ten years after the conclusion of the Hague Conven-
tion, the CRC was finalized under United Nations auspices." The CRC is
the first universal human rights treaty drafted to enhance and protect the
rights of children.52 The CRC was opened for signature on January 26,
1990 and entered into force less than a year later, on September 2, 1990.
To date, it is the most ratified human rights treaty, with 193 state par-
ties." Interestingly, the United States is not a party to the CRC, though it
still adheres to the substantive principles relevant to the issue at hand,
including the best interests principle."
As the preamble of the CRC demonstrates, the convention recog-
nizes that the child is entitled to special care and assistance, while also
enjoying other human rights enjoyed by all people." It is a manifestation
of the transition from a paternalistic view of the child as an "object" of
law, to a perception of the child as a "subject" of independent rights, ca-
pable of forming, expressing, and at times even asserting his or her own
48. In re M and another (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55,
[2008] 1 A.C. 1288 (H.L.), [34] (appeal taken from Eng.); In re S. (A Minor) (Abduction:
Custody Rights), [1993] Fam. 242, 251-52 (A.C.) (Eng.).
49. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069; In re C, [1999] 1 F.L.R. 1145; CA 2338/09 Plonit v.
Ploni, 26 (June 3, 2009) (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files/09/380/023/hl2/
09023380.hl2.pdf, CA 7206/93 Gabai v. Gabai 51(2) PD 241, 250-53 [1997] (Isr.); BAIN-
HAM, supra note 11, at 758.
50. P&ez-Vera, supra note 13, at 460, 114; see, e.g., CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 26;
CA 7206/93 Gabai v. Gabai 51(2) PD 241, 250-53 [1997] (Isr.).
51. See CRC, supra note 19.
52. TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAw 47 (2005).
53. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=V-
I1&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
54. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, NAVIGATING CUSTODY &
VISITATION EVALUATIONS IN CASES WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A JUDGE'S GUIDE, 10-12
(2006), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/BenchGuide.pdf (discussing the task of
American Judges in determining the best interests of the child).
55. CRC, supra note 19, pmbl.; Rhona Schuz, The Hague Child Abduction Convention
and Children's Rights, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393,400 (2002).
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views and rights. Based on this notion, the CRC is focused on four ba-
sic principles: the principle of equality and non-discrimination (Article
2); the principle of the child's best interests (Article 3); the principle of
life, survival, and development (Article 6); and the principle of participa-
tion and respect for the views of the child (Article 12)."
A number of articles of the CRC are of particular interest. Article 3
establishes a child's right for his or her best interests be taken into ac-
count in all proceedings relevant to him or her:
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, ad-
ministrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection
and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into ac-
count the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians,
or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to
this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative
58
measures ....
Article 9 guarantees a child's right to family life, including a bar on
separating the child from his or her parents:
1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated
from his or her parents against their will, except when competent
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance
with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is nec-
essary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may
be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or
neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are
living separately and a decision must be made as to the child's
place of residence.
56. BUCK, supra note 52; LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD: UNITED NATIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS XVi (1995); Cris R. Revaz,
An Introduction to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
U.S. RATIFICATION 9-10 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik, Cris R. Revaz, eds., 2006)
("[C]hildren are to be recognized as individuals with their own voice.").
57. Comm. Rts. Child, General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of Periodic
Reports to be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph 1(b), of the Convention
4-5, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58/Rev.1 (Nov. 29, 2005); BUCK, supra note 52, at 58-61; SHARON
DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD 92 (1999).
58. CRC, supra note 19, art. 3.
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2. In any proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present ar-
ticle, all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings and make their views known.
3. States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is sepa-
rated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and
direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is
contrary to the child's best interests.
Relatedly, Article 7 of the CRC obliges state parties to ensure that the
child enjoys, "as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents.""
Article 12 contains the child's right to participate and voice his or
her own views in matters relating to him or her, particularly in legal pro-
ceedings:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of form-
ing his or her own views the right to express those views freely
in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent
with the procedural rules of national law.6
Finally, Articles 11 and 35 of the CRC urge states to adopt, or accede
to existing, international agreements that combat the illicit transfer and
abduction of children from one country to another, for any purpose:
1. States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer
and non-return of children abroad.
2. To this end, States Parties shall promote the conclusion of bi-
lateral or multilateral agreements or accession to existing
62
agreements.
In this context it is worth mentioning that the Hague Convention was
the principal international treaty on child abduction known to the
negotiating parties who were drafting Articles 11 and 35.63 Nevertheless,
59. Id. art. 9.
60. Id. art. 7.
61. Id. art. 12.
62. Id. art. 11; see also id. art 35.
63. DETRICK, supra note 57, at 207-10.
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the fact that the CRC recognizes the need for arrangements such as those
set out in the Hague Convention does not necessarily imply that the latter
is in harmony with the former, in letter or in practice.
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION-A NEED FOR CHANGE?
This Part will put forward various opinions as to whether the Hague
Convention and CRC are in harmony or conflict with each other. Some
scholars are of the opinion that conflicting human rights norms (chiefly
those outlined in the CRC, but others pertaining to gender-related abuse
as well) must lead to the re-evaluation of the traditional application of
the Hague Convention. After laying out the claims made against the tra-
ditional application of the Hague Convention, the last Sections of this
Part will question whether the Hague Convention is at all in conflict with
human rights regimes.
Among courts and legal scholars, there are differing views on the
ways human rights impact international child abduction cases. Human
rights norms are often used as a legal basis to deny the return of children.
Some courts, though, have refused to engage with certain human rights
questions altogether on procedural grounds.6 A different stance adopted
by some courts maintains that the Hague Convention is merely a proce-
dural mechanism, and therefore issues like the best interests of the child
are irrelevant to decisions on return. Instead, these are issues of sub-
stance that are to be determined in the child's place of habitual
residence. In this view, no conflict exists between human rights and the
Hague Convention because the Convention is applied in a "human rights
vacuum" as strictly a matter of procedure.
Contrary to this view, it has been asserted, correctly to my mind, that
this interpretation is in direct conflict with the clear wording of Article 3
of the CRC, which obligates state courts to consider the best interests of
the child "in all actions concerning children" undertaken in courts of
law." Nothing would imply that the Hague Convention is an exception to
the obligation provided for in Article 3, as a matter of lex specialis or
otherwise."
64. E.g., S v. B (Abduction: Human Rights), [2005] EWHC (Fam) 733, [53]-[56],
[2005] 2 Fam. 878, (Eng.).
65. See, e.g., Murray v. Dir., Family Servs., (1993) 116 F.L.R. 321, 339-40 (Austl.); see
also CA 5332/93 D.G. v. E.G. 49(3) PD 282, 1[17, translated in INT'L CHILD ABDUCTION
DATABASE (INCADAT), http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0355.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).
66. CRC, supra note 19, art. 3(1); Schuz, supra note 55, at 436.
67. The premise of both those who argue that the Hague Convention and its application
infringes on human rights, and those who claim the opposite, is that both bodies of law bind
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Other courts address the interplay between human rights and the
Hague Convention directly, concluding that the policy considerations
that lay behind the Hague Convention prevail over the human rights
questions, even as the latter continue to bind the court.6  Some have
opined that because serving the best interests of the child is only one of
the purposes of the Hague Convention, and its effectiveness relies on the
the courts of a state which is party to the CRC and the Hague Convention, when they adjudi-
cate an application for return from another Hague Convention member state's Central
Authority or national. Yet, one might advance the argument that the Hague Convention is lex
specialis when it applies, rendering the lex generalis in the CRC inapplicable, and thus irrele-
vant to the return procedures under international law. This argument is without merit. In our
case, the question of conflict between the two bodies of law is the matter in dispute. In such a
situation, the customary methods of interpretation instruct us to harmonize the two bodies of
law to the furthest extent possible. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study Group
of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9 and July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, 1 14(17)-(21),
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Study Group of the Inter-
national Law Commission].
Viewing the Hague Convention as lex specialis does not mean that the CRC ceases to
apply to proceedings affecting children. Simply stating that the Hague Convention is a sort of
lex specialis does not obviate the need for reconciliation between the Hague Convention and
the CRC. See Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, supra,
14(4)-(9). Moreover, the legal frameworks of both bodies of law suggest that neither intends
to exclude the other. Not only is the promotion of the child's best interests, as discussed above,
one of the objectives of the Hague Convention, but the experts of the parties to the Hague
Conference on Private International Law clearly opined "that the best interest of the child lay
at the heart of both Conventions." Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Oct. 30-Nov. 9,
2006, Report on the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the
Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
and the Practical Implementation of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdic-
tion, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, 1 162-167 (Mar. 2007) [herein-
after Report on the Fifth Meeting], available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
abd_2006_rpt-e.pdf (rejecting as unnecessary a proposal by Switzerland to expand the Hague
Convention's exceptions in order to better serve, in its opinion, the best interests of the child).
On the other hand, the drafters of the CRC made clear that the best interests of the child must
be taken into account in "all actions concerning children." CRC, supra note 19, art. 3(1). Be-
ing fully aware of the operation of the Hague Convention, they could have chosen to treat
child abductions as lex specialis, and exclude them from the application of the CRC generally,
or Article 3 in particular, but refrained from doing so.
Finally, it should be noted that when states are obliged to comply with both the Hague
Convention and the CRC, and questions of competing norms and their harmonization arise
before judicial or quasi-judicial bodies created under one of the international regimes, these
bodies may be inclined to ignore applicable norms from the competing regime, or give more
weight to the norms of its own regime. See Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a
Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 27, 33
(2005); see also Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849, 857 (2004). National courts however, are not part of any re-
gime and are in an optimal position to reconcile fairly between the two bodies of law.
68. In re M and another (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55,
[200811 A.C. 1288 (H.L.), [42] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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fast return of children to their place of habitual residence, the child's best
interests-though still a primary consideration-can only be considered
in a limited fashion.9 Courts further point to Articles 11 and 35 of the
CRC itself, which call on states to enter international agreements per-
taining to the illicit transfer and abduction of children across borders.o
As previously mentioned, many see this as a mechanism that ensures
respect for children's rights at large, even at the expense of the welfare
of a specific child in a given case.7'
But is this enough? If the child's best interests must be taken into ac-
count in every court proceeding, can a notion of the general welfare of
children suffice to say that the Hague Convention is reconciled with the
CRC and other human rights treaties? Interpreters of the CRC have in-
deed found that the phrase "all actions concerning children" is meant to
apply broadly, not only to matters pertaining to a specific child, but also
to policy level decisions affecting children at large.72 Yet, all of these in-
terpretations take as a given that Article 3(1) entails, at its core, an
individual dimension, and the best interests of the specific child must be
taken into account in any legal proceeding affecting that child.73 For this
reason, it is correct to assert that the principle of the best interests of the
child has an individual aspect to it, aimed at protecting the interests of a
specific child in a court of law.74 Indeed, representatives of the member
states to the Hague Conference on Private International Law have recog-
nized the relevance of the child's best interests when deliberating a
return." Therefore, if courts fail to consider the best interests of the par-
ticular child as a primary consideration, they will fail to meet their state's
obligations under Article 3(1) of the CRC.6
69. CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 26 (June 3, 2009) (Isr.), available at http://
elyon I.court.gov.il/files/09/380/023/hI2/09023380.h12.pdf.
70. E.g., Murray, 116 F.L.R. at 339 (Austl.).
71. CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 127; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750; Kaye, supra
note 9, at 195; Jude Reddaway & Heather Keating, Child Abduction: Would Protecting Vul-
nerable Children Drive a Coach and Four Through the Principles of the Hague Convention?,
5 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 77, 94, 96 (1997).
72. Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture
and Human Rights, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 14 (Philip Alston ed., 1994); DETRICK, supra note 57, at 90; Michael
Freeman, Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1, 46 (Andr6 Alen et al. eds., 2007);
Elisabeth A. Mason, The Best Interests of the Child, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.
RATIFICATION 121, 122 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik, & Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006). The
phrase itself is found in CRC, supra note 19, art. 3(1).
73. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 72, at 21.
74. See Schuz, supra note 55, at 436-37.
75. Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 67.
76. Schuz, supra note 55, at 436.
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A. The Hague Convention's Incompatibility with Human Rights
1. The Best Interests of the Child
Based on this understanding of the best interests of the child, some
claim that the application of the Hague Convention violates the best in-
terests of the child requirement enumerated in the CRC. It has been
asserted that courts applying the Hague Convention "have consistently
refused to consider the argument that returning the child is not in accor-
dance with his or her best interests and on occasion returned children
with the knowledge that that return is not in accordance with their best
interests."" As the argument goes, courts do this in light of the implicit
recognition of the Hague Convention found in Articles 11 and 35 of the
CRC."' Opponents of this approach contend that the recognition of the
need to fight child abduction does not indicate that the Hague Conven-
tion is necessarily in line with the CRC, nor that the important objects of
the Hague Convention should absolutely override the rights of the
child.
Moreover, it is argued that, while return under the Hague Convention
is not aimed at deciding custody, a return may nevertheless impact the
final custody battle over the child, as the court deciding custody may
consider the need for stability in the child's life and opt to leave him or
her in the care of the local parent.o In addition, the return itself might
affect the welfare of the child in a way that cannot be remedied by the
court deciding the custody issue later in time."
According to Ronna Schuz, the underlying assumption of the Hague
Convention that the interests of the child are best protected in his or her
place of habitual residence is not universally correct.82 She contends that
the premise is valid only so long as courts in the place of residence
respect the best interests of the child subsequently," and, secondly, only
when the place of the child's residence is the forum conveniens to hear
the case.' Moreover, she asserts that even if the premise is true, it does
not necessarily follow that it is in the best interests of the child to
77. Id. at 435; see also Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 67, 162.
78. CRC, supra note 19, arts. 11, 35; Schuz, supra note 55, at 437.
79. Schuz, supra note 55, at 437.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 437-38.
83. See John Caldwell, Child Abduction Cases: Evaluating Risks to the Child and the
Convention, 23 N.Z.U. L. REv. 161, 176 (2008), and the view taken by the New Zealand Court
of Appeal in A v. A, [1996] NZFLR 529 (CA), 17-18, where it was found that a "grave risk"
will generally not exist when returning to a state that treats the best interests of the child as a
paramount consideration.
84. Schuz, supra note 55, at 438.
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actually reside in the place of residence pending the final settlement of
custody rights."
Another contested underlying assumption of the Hague Convention
is that a prompt return serves the best interests of the child. With re-
spect to this assumption, Schuz argues that the exemptions from return
are so narrowly construed that they do not encompass all of the situa-
tions where a return might run contrary to the best interests of that
child." Moreover, as argued above, the general rationale of deterrence
and the interests of children as a whole cannot suffice to justify a return
that goes against the best interests of a specific abducted child standing
before the court."
Schuz offers what she terms as an "alternative reconciliation"
method of interpreting the two bodies of law. Under this scheme, a court
must interpret the exceptions to return-especially the "grave risk" ex-
ception-in such a way that it will deny return when the return cannot be
reconciled with the obligation to consider the best interests of the child
as a primary consideration." The argument relies on the contention that
the drafters of the Hague Convention originally envisioned situations
where a father abducts the child from the hands of the mother, the pri-
mary caretaker of the child." But in today's reality, where it is frequently
the mother and primary caretaker who abducts the child, a return would
not restore the status quo but rather create an entirely different situation
for the child. This reality makes it more difficult to find that a return to
the hands of the non-primary caretaker father-even if only temporary-
coincides with weighing the best interests of the child as a primary con-
sideration." Further, as some argue, the drafters did not intend for courts
to return children where this decision would jeopardize their safety, or
where the mother is fleeing domestic violence. 92 In such situations,
Schuz is of the opinion that courts have ruled to return a child solely in
order to avoid undermining the Hague Convention. She and others be-
lieve this to be too narrow a reading of the objects and purposes of the
Hague Convention.93
Indeed, in recent years, judges applying different jurisprudences
have expressed concern regarding the so-called outdated assumptions
85. Id.
86. Id. at 439.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 441.
90. Id. at 442; Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 9, at 608-09.
91. Schuz, supra note 55, at 438; see also Caldwell, supra note 83, at 164-65.
92. See Caldwell, supra note 83, at 164.
93. Schuz, supra note 55, at 446. Schuz also doubts whether the use of undertakings by
courts is an effective remedy to maintain the welfare of the child upon return. Id. at 447-48.
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underlying the Hague Convention.94 These concerns triggered the Swiss
delegation to the Hague Conference on Private International Law to sug-
gest an amendment to the Hague Convention. The delegation suggested
that the Hague Convention should deny return where the primary care-
taker abducted a child, the caretaker cannot be reasonably asked to
return with the child to the place of habitual residence, and placing the
child back with the left-behind parent or in foster care in the place of
residence would not be in the child's best interests.5 The reasoning be-
hind the failed Swiss proposal was that the current construction of the
grave risk exception is too narrow, and courts should expand the notion
of an intolerable situation found in Article 13(b) in order to deny return
in a broader range of cases.
The arguments regarding domestic violence are elaborated below,
yet it is worth mentioning here that these are usually accompanied by
claims regarding the psychological dangers for children exposed to
spousal abuse. These children are at a higher risk to develop emotional
problems, including fear, insecurity, anxiety, low self-esteem, and guilt,
which may lead to drug abuse or violent behavioral tendencies.97 They
may also suffer from impaired cognitive and motor development and
delayed verbal development.98
Thus, with respect to the best interests of the child, a child should
not be returned when the return will not promote his or her best interests,
nor provide any real benefit to the child. These arguments ultimately call
for a broader interpretation of the grave risk exception by courts apply-
ing the Hague Convention, or for an amendment or protocol to the
Hague Convention, in order to reconcile the two legal regimes.w
2. The Right to Family Life
In addition to violating the best interests of the child, some claim
that the application of the Hague Convention violates the right to family
life enumerated in the CRC. As explained in Part I, a court can decide
not to return a child where it has been shown that the left-behind parent
94. Caldwell, supra note 83, at 163-65.
95. Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following Swit-
zerland's Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 335, 339-44 (2008)
[hereinafter Weiner, Intolerable Situations]. The proposal was rejected by the Fifth Session
and incorporated into Swiss law. See Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 67, 163.
96. Weiner, Intolerable Situations, supra note 95, at 341-43.
97. Wills, supra note 10, at 453-54; see also Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on
the Children: Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding The Hague Convention on Interna-
tional Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 669, 690 (2001).
98. Nelson, supra note 97, at 690.
99. Caldwell, supra note 83, at 169-73; Schuz, supra note 55, at 451.
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has consented to or acquiesced in the wrongful removal.' 9 Nevertheless,
the wording of this exception, and subsequent judicial decisions inter-
preting it, do not consider the right of the child to maintain direct contact
with both parents.'' In other cases, such as when a child is removed by a
parent to his or her place of habitual residence from another country (and
hence, no return can be ordered as the child is already in his or her place
of residence), Schuz claims that that forum cannot always ensure the
child's right to maintain regular contact with both parents. The access
provisions found in the Hague Convention would not suffice to ensure
contact either.0 2
3. The Right to Be Heard
Another right claimed to be affected by the Hague Convention is the
child's right to be heard, which is protected under the CRC. It is argued
that Article 13, which allows courts to deny return under certain circum-
stances when a child objects to such return,'03 leaves it to the parent who
objects to the return to articulate the child's wishes, while the court need
not consider the wishes of the child on its own initiative." The right of
the child to be heard should allow, in theory, for a child to initiate pro-
ceedings for return to his or her place of residence, even when no such
application was made by the left-behind parent.'05 It is even argued that
to deem a removal wrongful under the Hague Convention when the child
has not objected to it, can itself be considered a violation of the child's
right to be heard.'"
As for the methods of obtaining the child's views, courts tend to do
so through a welfare officer or psychologist working on behalf of the
court, or through the parents. This, some say, does not suffice to truly
represent the child before the court.'07 The tendency not to hear the child
after the submission of an expert opinion to the court, since such a hear-
ing would be moot, is claimed to abuse the child's rights as well. This is
because the court should judge for itself the true opinion and the level of
maturity of the child regarding the issue of return.'
Though hearing the child directly is the desirable choice,'" some
claim that courts should appoint a child representative in cases when
100. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 13.
101. Schu, supra note 55, at 413-14.
102. Id. at 414-15.
103. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 13, para. 3.
104. Schuz, supra note 55, at 418-19.
105. Id. at 420-21.
106. Id. at 418.
107. Id. at 421; see also Weiner, Intolerable Situations, supra note 95.
108. Schuz, supra note 55, at 421-24.
109. Id. at 432.
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there is evidence that the child objects to return, when the child requests
to return even though the parents did not file such a request themselves,
or when questions arise regarding the determination of the place of resi-
dence, the existence of grave risk, or the parent's consent or
acquiescence."o In the complexities of Hague Convention cases, it is ar-
gued that child representatives will prove crucial in assessing the best
interests of the child, in addition to his or her views on return and other
rights."' Nevertheless, separate representation for the child is far less
common than warranted, and thus, according to this view, in violation of
the right to be heard." 2 In response, newly enacted Swiss law provides
for children's counsel in all applications under the Hague Convention,
due mainly to the fact that a child's interests are not always represented
by his or her parents."' As Merle H. Weiner points out, though appoint-
ment of an independent counsel might prolong court proceedings, this is
preferable to the court expeditiously reaching the wrong decision.'l4
Moreover, some contend that a court should allow a child to express
his or her views, even if they will not influence its decision, because it is
beneficial to involve the child in the proceedings and facilitate his or her
acceptance of the judgment."' Though in some return cases, it could be
argued that the child should be spared from court proceedings for his or
her own benefit. Schuz claims that this line of thought should not be ex-
aggerated, as the court can always adjust procedures for the benefit of
the child's well-being, thus letting him or her fulfill the right to be
heard."'6
As for the weight to be given to a child's objections, the court has
wide discretion under Article 13 of the Hague Convention to take into
account the age and maturity of the child."' In order to abide by Article
12 of the CRC, it is argued, courts should not take a stringent approach
when assessing the weight to be given to a child's opinions on return."
Thus, in cases where the child has expressed a strong view against return
to the place of residence, his or her wishes should be respected, even
110. INGLIs, supra note 11, at 608-09; see also Elizabeth Pitman, Making the Interests of
the Child Paramount: Representation for Children in the Hague Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 515, 532-36 (2009)
(describing the necessity of legal guardians in grave risk of harm cases adopting the "best
interests of the child" standard); Schuz, supra note 55, at 431-32.
111. See Pitman, supra note 110, at 532-36.
112. See Schuz, supra note 55, at 432-33.
113. Weiner, Intolerable Situations, supra note 95, at 376, 382-83.
114. See id. at 398-99.
115. See, e.g., PATRICK PARKINSON & JUDY CASHMORE, THE VOICE OF A CHILD IN
FAMILY LAw DISPUTEs 191, 212 (2008); Schuz, supra note 55, at 423.
116. Schuz, supra note 55, at 423-24.
117. CRC, supra note 19, art. 13.
118. Schuz, supra note 55, at 425-28.
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when they conflict with the objects of the Hague Convention, or even his
or her best interests.' 9
4. Domestic Violence and Gender Issues
Some have tried to demonstrate the problematic application of the
Hague Convention with respect to matters of gender and domestic
violence. 2 0 Thus, though domestic violence and gender related issues are
not directly related to the CRC, this issue frequently comes up in pro-
ceedings under the Hague Convention. Miranda Kaye, for example,
argues that as courts feel obliged to construe the exceptions to return
narrowly, they are unsympathetic to the plea of a female abductor who
alleges abuse and refuses to return with the child to his or her place of
residence. 2' At other times, courts will deem the mother's situation ir-
relevant to the issue of return.122 The mother in these cases, Kaye notes,
will usually claim that returning the child without her will put the child
at grave psychological risk, yet courts often reject the claim in laconic
ways, reasoning that the mother is trying to achieve her goals by ma-
nipulating the law.' This attitude forces mothers to return with their
children to the place of habitual residence, thus exposing the abused
mother to further dangers.'" Doing so, however, may also be considered
a violation of the mother's right to security of personl25 and her right not
to be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment.126 Courts would be well
advised to make the connection between a mother's physical and psy-
chological state and her ability to function as the child's caretaker.' 7
To counter concerns that a mother or child will be endangered upon
return to the country of an abusing father, Kaye contends that courts re-
sort to ineffective undertakings (obligations on the part of the father to
comply with the court's orders outside of the court's jurisdiction) or as-
sume-without any real basis-that adequate legal mechanisms exist to
protect their safety.128 Furthermore, courts have belittled the impact that
witnessing domestic violence perpetrated against the mother by the
119. Id. at 428.
120. Kaye, supra note 9; see also Caldwell, supra note 83, at 179-80 (arguing that New
Zealand courts have recently started to consider Kaye's arguments).
121. Kaye, supra note 9, at 197.
122. Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 9, at 654-56.
123. Kaye, supra note 9, at 197-98.
124. Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 9, at 630.
125. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
126. Id. art.7.
127. See Pollastro v. Pollastro, [1999] 118 O.A.C. 169, 134 (Can.); Weiner, Domestic
Violence, supra note 9, at 652-53.
128. Kaye, supra note 9, at 198-202; Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 9, at 657,
678.
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father may have on their mutual child, failing to find that such violence
is grounds for denial of returning the child to the custody of his or her
father.129 Finally, Kaye claims that courts tend to "normalize" violence
against women.3 o Instead of taking an active stance against what, in
Kaye's opinion, is becoming common abusive behavior, courts assert
that denying return because the mother will be exposed to physical vio-
lence will drive a "coach and four" through the Hague Convention."' All
of these patterns demonstrate a lack of adequate consideration and action
by courts interpreting the Hague Convention in the context of violence
inflicted against mothers and their children.13 2
Weiner thus concludes that a new exception to return should be
added to the Hague Convention, to be applied when a parent is fleeing
domestic violence."' According to this line of reasoning, broadening the
scope of cases where return will not be ordered will not undermine the
objects and purposes of the Hague Convention, as courts have already
internalized the notion that a full-scale inquiry into the welfare of the
child is unwarranted at that point in time.'
It is noteworthy that recently, some courts have begun to take the ar-
guments laid out in this Section into account in their judgments in
abduction cases, reflecting a so-called shift to a "child-centered" para-
digm.'15 For example, in DP v. Commonwealth Central Authority,'3 6
while interpreting a domestic regulation implementing a "grave risk"
exception with language identical to the Hague Convention, the Austra-
lian High Court stressed a shift away from a narrow interpretation of the
term:
There is, in these circumstances, no evident choice to be made
between a "narrow" and "broad" construction of the regulation.
If that is what is meant by saying that it is to be given a "narrow
129. Kaye, supra note 9, at 203; Nelson, supra note 97, at 688-89.
130. Kaye, supra note 9, at 203-05.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 205; see also Caldwell, supra note 83, at 179; Linda Silberman, Patching Up
the Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and a Suggestion for
Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 41, 46 (2003) [hereinafter Silberman, Patching
Up].
133. Weiner, Domestic Violence, supra note 9, at 694-703.
134. Schuz, supra note 55, at 425-26.
135. See Caldwell, supra note 83 (discussing the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth
courts).
136. DP v. Commonwealth Cent. Auth., (2001) 206 CLR 401 (Austl.).
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construction" it must be rejected. The exception is to be given
the meaning its words require. 3 1
Another example relates to the sufficient provision of evidence in
abduction cases. Notwithstanding the need for prompt return, the Austra-
lian High Court has emphasized the need for a "thorough examination
on adequate evidence of the issues arising on wrongful removal applica-
tions under the Regulations." 38 In another case, the Court stated that
"[p]rompt listing for hearing is one thing; an over-hasty and insufficient
hearing is another."'" Finally, in Walsh v. Walsh, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that spousal abuse, even when
no acts of violence were committed against the abducted child, amounts
to a grave risk to the child under Article 13 of the Hague Convention.'"
This last understanding of the grave risk exception was cited as a possi-
ble valid interpretation by the United States Supreme Court in an obiter
dictum.141
John Caldwell is therefore correct to take notice of the words of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stating that the
Hague Convention "place[s] a higher premium on children's safety than
on their return." 42 This quote demonstrates a possible shift in the way
courts in the near future will interpret the Hague Convention in light of
substantive human rights considerations. Thus, an assessment of the va-
lidity of these human rights based arguments is of significant practical
importance.
B. Consolidating the Two Legal Instruments:
Is There Really a Conflict?
In the following Section, two arguments will be put forward to
counter the claim that the Hague Convention and its traditional applica-
tion violate human rights norms. The first argument is that the best
interests of the child are relevant only to a limited extent under the
Hague Convention, and thus understood, the child's rights are not vio-
lated by the latter. The second argument directly questions the soundness
of the human rights analysis presented in the previous Section.
137. Id. 144. Two other justices expressed their agreements with this interpretation of
the exception to return. Id. 9 (Gleeson, C.J., concurring); Id. 191 (Callinan, J., concurring).
See also Caldwell, supra note 83, at 172-73.
138. MW v. Dir.-Gen., Dep't of Cmty. Servs., (2008) 244 A.L.R. 205, 118 (Austl.).
139. De L v. Dir.-Gen., N.S.W. Dep't of Cmty. Servs., (1996) 187 CLR 640, 660
(Austi.).
140. Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000).
141. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1997 (2010).
142. Caldwell, supra note 83, at 188 (quoting Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2008)).
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1. The Limited Applicability of the Best Interests of the Child
This Section, in an attempt to reconcile the Hague Convention with
the CRC, presents the argument that during a hearing on return under the
Hague Convention, the best interests of the child are "a primary consid-
eration," but only in a limited sense. As mentioned briefly in the previous
Section, when deciding whether to return a child, courts have balanced
the objects and purposes of the Hague Convention-that of deterrence,
respect for the laws of other sovereigns, and the best interests of children
in general-against the apparent best interests or wishes of the specific
child. Yet, some courts have recognized the weight-albeit limited-that
human rights carry when considering a return under the Hague Conven-
tion.
This approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of Israel in a case
decided in 2009.'4 The case involved an Israeli mother married to a
French citizen, and their six-year-old son.'" The mother came to Israel
with the agreement of the father, in order to give birth to her second
son.145 While in Israel, the mother filed for custody over the six-year-old
boy in a local family court.'4 The father, now in Israel, then filed a re-
quest for the courts in Israel to return the son to his place of habitual
residence, Paris, where divorce and custody proceedings were under-
way.'47 While in Israel, the mother gave birth to the second son, to whom
the Hague Convention was not applicable, because the newborn baby
had never resided in France.148 The Court upheld the return of the older
brother to France and rejected the argument that applying the Hague
Convention does not conform with the best interests of the child, as
enumerated in the CRC.149
As the argument goes, the drafters of the Hague Convention took ac-
count of the complexities of custody issues, such as the difficulties in
obtaining evidence away from the child's place of habitual residence,1o
when they envisioned a scenario where the local courts in the country of
the child's habitual residence would decide the permanent custody rights
143. CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 1 26 (June 3, 2009) (Isr.), available at http://
elyon1.court.gov.il/files/09/380/023/hl2/09023380.hl2.pdf. At the time of judgment, the Au-
thor was a Legal Clerk for the chambers of the Honorable Justice Salim Joubran, writer of the







149. Id. 11 26-27.
150. Id. 126.
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over the child."' To effectuate this, states created a procedural mecha-
nism to allow for the swift return of abducted children to their place of
residence, in order to nullify any effects the wrongful removal might
have on the child's welfare and legal status.'
It is only when the custody dispute is decided that the best interests
of the child should be heavily weighed, as these are at the core of the
custody decision.' Thus, as time is of the essence in matters of return,
the mechanism created under the Hague Convention is not a full-scale
judicial procedure, but rather an initial judicial response to "put out the
fire" until the courts in the place of residence can deal with the best in-
terests of the child in their totality when deciding upon final custody
over the child.15 4 As B.D. Inglis points out, return does not mean that the
child will ultimately live in the place of habitual residence and, likewise,
a return does not necessitate that the child ultimately remain in the cus-
tody of the abducting parent. Nor does return mean that the child will be
in the custody of the left-behind parent pending final resolution of the
custody issue.' It merely places the child back in the place of habitual
residence and before its courts. 56
At the initial stage, when the only matter to be determined is which
court should further adjudicate the future of the child, the child's best
interests should only come into play when the act of return itself may
infringe on the child's interests. This refers only to the limited time be-
tween the return of the child and the commencement of proceedings
before a court in the place of habitual residence capable of issuing in-
terim measures protecting the best interests of the child if necessary.' It
is only in this narrow time that the best interests of the child are "a pri-
mary consideration" in the forum deliberating a return order, as required
by Article 3 of the CRC.' The restricted applicability of the best inter-
ests of the child entails fewer situations where these interests will be a
key factor to deny the return of the child. With this in mind, there is little
room for finding that a child should not be returned to the place of resi-
151. Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1(b), 19; CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 26;
CA 5332/93 Gunzburg v. Greenwald, 49(3) IsrSC 282, 19-12 [1995] (Isr.), English version
available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0355.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
152. Pdtez-Vera, supra note 13, IN 19, 35 (referring to a system of cooperation among
judicial and administrative authorities without any bearing on the merits of the custody of the
child in question); see also CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 26; BAINHAM, supra note 11, at 750.
153. CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 1 26.
154. Id.; CA 7206/93 Gabai v. Gabai 51(2) PD 241, 251 [1997] (Isr.).
155. See INGLIS, supra note II, at 544 (discussing how a decision to return does not
decide the state in which the child will ultimately reside).
156. Id.
157. CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, $ 26; CA 7206/93 Gabai v. Gabai 51(2) PD 241, 251
[1997] (Isr.); see also INGLIs, supra note 11, at 549, 604.
158. CRC, supra note 19, art. 3.
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dence; only extreme situations where the return itself exposes him or her
to a grave risk or an intolerable situation, or when a mature child makes
a sound objection to the return itself (as opposed to his or her view on
the custodial situation) would apply. Accordingly, the exceptions enu-
merated in the Hague Convention are narrowly tailored for the limited
consideration of the best interests of the child in this context, but without
disregarding the child's rights.
This argument, though satisfactory in a formalistic sense, does not
directly address the claim that the two conventions are contradictory.
Rather, it avoids the issue by limiting the application of the CRC and the
best interests principle. The next Section will directly engage the correct
understanding of the relationship between the two conventions, when
both are fully applied.
2. Human Rights Norms Reanalyzed
Another avenue to address the aforementioned human rights con-
cerns is by questioning the analysis upon which they are based. Though
the relationship between a return order and the CRC is dependent first
and foremost on the facts at hand in each case, this Section will argue
that some considerations, neglected by those who attack the conformity
of the Hague Convention with the CRC, must be added to the human
rights evaluation. Ultimately, this leads to different conclusions regard-
ing the alleged contradictions between the two bodies of law.
a. The Best Interests of the Child
The sharpest-and most common-criticism of the Hague Conven-
tion is that it does now allow for proper consideration of the best
interests of the child as required under the CRC."9 As opposed to the
practical outcome suggested by applying Schuz's "alternative reconcilia-
tion" model, courts are obliged to consider the best interests of the child in
legal proceedings as "a primary consideration," yet not as the primary
consideration, and certainly not as the only consideration.'60 The language
employed by the drafters is not coincidental. Elsewhere in the CRC, in
Article 9(1) for example, the drafters explicitly referred to the best inter-
ests of the child as the only relevant consideration to separate a child from
his or her parent.'6' In Article 18(1) of the CRC, the best interests of the
child are referred to as the "basic concern" of the parents.1' The travaux
pr6paratoires of the CRC reveal that an initial draft containing the phrase
159. See infra Part II.B.1.
160. CRC, supra note 19, art. 3 (emphasis added).
161. Id. art. 9(1); Alston, supra note 72, at 13.
162. CRC, supra note 19, art. 18(1); see also Alston, supra note 72, at 13.
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"paramount consideration" was rejected, as was a proposal containing
the phrase "the primary consideration.""' Instead, the final wording of
the article places the best interests of the child as merely one primary
consideration among others in any given judicial decision concerning
him or her, as stated by Philip Alston:
While this choice may be contestable in the context of custody
decisions in which the principle is best known in domestic law, it
could hardly have been otherwise in the context of an umbrella
provision designed to be applicable in a very wide range of
situations in which a vast array of competing considerations
might arguably be both relevant and appropriate.'"
It follows that considerations outside of the specific child's rights-
such as general deterrence, or the existence of an effective mechanism
promoting the best interests of children in general' 65-can and must be
balanced in legal proceedings under the CRC as primary considerations,
as long as the best interests of that specific child are considered as a
primary consideration as well.'6 Hence, a court should only find that a
return places a child in an intolerable situation when it finds that the best
interests of that specific child outweigh "the potential benefits all chil-
dren receive from deterring international abduction."6
Furthermore, other viable primary considerations that are not always
in line with the specific child's best interests may be taken into account.
For instance, the court may take into account the custody rights of the
left-behind parent and his or her human rights, including his or her right
to family life.'68 Moreover, though the Author agrees that respect for
other states' laws-another objective of the Hague Convention-should
not trump the child's best interests as such,'" it still is a significant con-
sideration. According to some theories of international law, state
interests, such as respect for their own laws, are a key factor in state be-
havior, which includes the decision to comply with international
163. Alston, supra note 72, at 13.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part L.A.
166. Sec'y for Justice v. HJ, [20071 2 NZLR 289 (SC), 50 (N.Z.); In re M and another
(Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55, [200811 A.C. 1288 (H.L.), [42]
(appeal taken from Eng.); INGLIS, supra note 11, at 595-96.
167. Weiner, Intolerable Situations, supra note 95, at 355.
168. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 125, art. 17(1);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
169. See Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that courts may con-
sider, but are not obliged to follow, fellow signatories' laws). This holding was later reiterated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 2009 (2010).
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norms.'70 Enhancing the rights of all children by promoting a mechanism
to deter potential abductors-as called for by the CRC itself'"-is a wor-
thy primary consideration. Ensuring member states' interests in
maintaining the effectiveness of the Hague Convention can be viewed as
a valid secondary consideration.
Schuz's alternative reconciliation model rejects such considerations,
and leads to the conclusion that the objects and purposes of the Hague
Convention could not legitimize a decision that infringes on the best in-
terests of the child. In other words, a return cannot be ordered, unless it
serves the best interests of the specific child.
These conclusions, as sympathetic as they may be, go beyond what
is required of states and their courts under the CRC. The most that can
be said is that courts would have to justify why a non-child-centered de-
cision was rendered, the onus being on the court to prove why other
considerations should prevail.172 Courts might reason that situations of
international child abduction are unique, forming a group of children in
need of special protection.'" Thus, they prescribe a result not always in
conformity with the best interests of the specific child before the court,
though those interests were considered, to a certain extent, under the ex-
ceptions provided for under the Hague Convention.
Moreover, if the best interests of the child are the primary or only
concern, as under Schuz's model, there is a risk that a Hague Convention
return proceeding will be transformed into a full-scale custody hearing.
This too is a consideration that is tolerated by the CRC. For example,
according to Linda Silberman, if evidence that a return will cause the
child "traumatic stress disorder" is deemed sufficient for denying return,
the summary nature essential to a Hague return proceeding will be trans-
formed into a full-scale custody hearing, that was otherwise meant to be
adjudicated in the place of habitual residence.'74 But it is crucial to
remember that a return is a temporary measure, with the goal of ensuring
that the child's future is decided in his or her natural surroundings; it is
not a decision about which parent is fit to retain custody over the
170. See Kenneth Abbot's account of the realist and institutionalist theories of interna-
tional law, in Kenneth W. Abbot, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 363-66 (1999).
171. CRC, supra note 19, arts. 2, 11, 35.
172. Alston, supra note 72, at 13.
173. Freeman, supra note 72, at 66.
174. Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty: Gender
Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221, 239 (2000) [hereinafter
Silberman, Hague Child Abduction Convention]; see also Silberman, supra note 132 (arguing
that the "traumatic stress disorder" standard can transform a summary Hague proceeding into
a full custody hearing).
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abducted child."' Any inconvenience inflicted on the child in the short
term must be weighed against the other objects of the Hague Conven-
tion, including his or her best interests in the long run, and only in rare
occasions will it justify a denial of return.
Furthermore, the Hague Convention may serve the best interests of
the child even when its operation does not at first appear to do so. For
instance, return to a member state that will not necessarily apply the best
interests of the child standard as such may still be in the best interests of
the child. In particular, such situations can arise when the child is ab-
ducted to a state that is culturally and socially distinct from his or her
place of residence. Article 13 of the Hague Convention reminds courts to
bear in mind the social background of the child.'76 This obligation is in
line with the CRC, which enumerates the right of the child to participate
in cultural life."' Unfortunately, the Committee on the Rights of the
Child has found that many states have not fully enacted the best interests
principle in their family law."" Hence, it is impractical to insist that the
state of habitual residence has done so as a precondition for an order of
return. .
Likewise, Article 12 of the Hague Convention grants courts the dis-
cretion to deny return if more than a year has passed between the date of
abduction and the commencement of proceedings, as long as it can be
shown that the child has settled into his or her new environment.7 9 This
exception serves the interests of those children who have settled into
their new environment, albeit creating an incentive for abducting parents
to cover their tracks, at least for one year.o Once more, this demon-
strates that the drafters of the Hague Convention allowed for proper
consideration of the best interests of the child in certain situations, where
those interests were understood to outweigh other considerations."'
The conclusion that a specific child-centered decision is not always
the right one under the CRC should not be altered because today's ab-
ductions typically involve the primary caretaker, who more often than
not is the mother. The removal still affects the situation of the child prior
to the abduction, since the child has been removed to different surround-
ings. Putting aside for a moment the issue of custody, returning a child to
175. Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983
F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993); CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni, 126 (June 3, 2009) (Isr.), avail-
able at http://elyonl.court.gov.ii/files/09/380/023/hl2/09023380.hl2.pdf; CA 7206/93 CA
7206/93 Gabai v. Gabai 51(2) PD 241, 252 [1997] (Isr.); Nrez-Vera, supra note 13, 19.
176. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 13.
177. CRC, supra note 19, art. 31.
178. Freeman, supra note 72, at 52-53.
179. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
180. INGLIs, supra note 11, at 599.
181. Id. at 598.
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his or her familiar surroundings (school, friends, familiar language, etc.)
would normally be in the child's best interests.'" Moreover, a return does
not imply temporary custody for the other parent, since the primary care-
taker could still enjoy his or her status in the place of habitual residence,
pending the final outcome of the custody hearing. Whatever effects a
return may have on the merits of the custody decision in terms of the
child's need for stability, the same could be said of the act of abduction
itself. The Hague Convention strives to nullify any effect the abduction
might have, and therefore a child facing custody proceedings in his or
her place of residence after a return would not be-theoretically speak-
ing at least-in a different situation than he or she would be prior to the
abduction.
The relationship between the child's best interests and the child's
right to enjoy a family life is also of importance. The latter will be dis-
cussed in greater detail below, yet at this juncture one must keep in mind
that denial of return for whatever reason will usually intrude on the
rights of the child and the left-behind parent to enjoy family life together.
While one can argue that the parent will still enjoy access rights to the
abducted child, the same can be said for the abducting parent if he or she
chooses not to return with the child to the place of residence, pursuant to
an order or return. Since it is the abductor who is in breach of custodial
rights under the laws of the place of residence, the onus should be on
him or her to prove that return should not be ordered. Moreover, as pre-
viously mentioned, Article 9(1) allows for the separation of a child from
his or her parent only if it is "necessary for the best interests of the
child."'" The Hague Convention is, in fact, in line with this requirement.
The narrow scope of exceptions for return promises that a child will be
separated from his or her left-behind parent only when absolutely neces-
sary.
A final point on the best interests of the child regards the use of pre-
sumptions under the Hague Convention. The substance of the Hague
Convention deals with private international law issues, by predetermin-
ing the forum conveniens and the substantive law to be applied to the
custody dispute between the parents." This predetermination was agreed
upon to provide an effective legal framework to deal with the rising
number of international abductions-called by some an "intractable
problem."' Absent predetermined rules on the appropriate forum to
182. LowE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
183. CRC, supra note 19, art. 9.
184. INGLIS, supra note 11, at 535-36.
185. Peter H. Pfund, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child: Contribu-
tions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & Comp. L.
665, 667 (1997).
539Spring 2011]1
Michigan Journal of International Law
adjudicate custody-in this case the courts of the place of habitual resi-
dence-member states find themselves in the very place they were prior
to ratification of the Hague Convention: lacking a mechanism that allows
for the prompt return of abducted children to their place of residence.
Additionally, it is important to remember that exceptions, narrowly con-
strued as they may be, are provided for in appropriate cases where the
presumption leads to an undesirable result. But to ensure the continuing
effectiveness of the regime, judges should continue to presume that it is
in the best interests of the child to return him or her to the place of resi-
dence, until proven otherwise.
To summarize, it seems that the parties to the Hague Convention are
correct to assert that the current legal framework provided by the Hague
Convention, and the narrow scope of its exceptions, establishes a highly
acceptable balance between the best interests of the child and other con-
siderations that sufficiently enables courts to deny return in those rare
situations, when such a decision is warranted to protect the best interests
of the child.8 7
b. The Right to Family Life
When deciding if consent or acquiescence applies to an allegedly
wrongful removal, the Hague Convention does not explicitly consider
the rights of the child to family life or to maintain contact with both par-
ents. Nevertheless, it is not inconsequential, as one of the underlying
objects of the Hague Convention is to override any effect that an abduc-
tion may have, and allow for issues of custody-encompassing within it
the child's enjoyment of family life and relations with both parents-to
be properly determined before a court of law. These questions are at the
heart of the Hague Convention, and inherent in deciding if a parent con-
sented to a removal, whether stated explicitly in the Hague Convention
or not. The narrow scope of the return exemptions ultimately serves to
promote the right to family life.
More importantly, it would be hard to maintain that a child could be
returned to the place of habitual residence upon his or her own request,
without a formal request made by the left-behind parent. This, of course,
would be absurd and impractical, when that parent has shown his or her
incapability or unwillingness to take care of the child pending a decision
on custody, while at the same time the abducting parent wishes to stay
put or does not intend to return with the child. Schuz argues that, at
times, no official request is filed due to the left-behind parent's "passiv-
186. In re M and another (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55,
[2008] 1 A.C. 1288 (H.L.), [39] (appeal taken from Eng.).
187. See Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 67,1 166.
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ity or lack of knowledge of his or her rights, fear of legal proceedings, or
lack of financial resources."'" Yet the establishment of Central Authori-
ties under the Hague Convention promotes the removal of procedural
and financial obstacles, for instance, by allowing the left-behind parent
to file a request of return with the local Central Authority in his or her
home state, rather than filing the request abroad. 8 9
Moreover, parties to the Hague Convention are obliged to provide fi-
nancial assistance to parents who cannot afford to represent their claims
before the courts of that state.'" Thus, a parent who wishes to retrieve his
or her child is provided every opportunity to do so.'9' Though theoreti-
cally a parent's waiver of his or her right to family life does not entail
that the child has no rights regarding that parent, it is (unfortunately) the
practical consequence of such a waiver, since a court allowing for a re-
turn of a child when a request by the left-behind parent has not been
made would be neglecting its duty to protect the interests and well-being
of that child.
Finally, on this point it should be noted that contrary to the claim
presented above, when a child is abducted to his or her place of habitual
residence, no issue could arise as to whether the court can ensure the
rights of the child to enjoy his or her family life under the Hague Con-
vention. Since under Article 3 of the Hague Convention a wrongful
removal is one that violates the custody laws of the place of residence,
the Hague Convention would not be applicable to such situations at all.
Hence, this claim is irrelevant to suggest any animosity between the
Hague Convention and the CRC.
c. The Right to Be Heard
Can a court's application of Article 13 of the Hague Convention vio-
late the right of the child to be heard under Article 12 of the CRC? First,
as per the argument that the child should be allowed to voice his or her
opinion regarding return, even when such a request was not made by the
left-behind parent, the same analysis presented above, regarding the right
to family life, renders this argument without any practical significance.
As explained above, a court cannot seriously consider returning a child
to his or her place of habitual residence if the parent there is unwilling or
188. Schuz, supra note 55, at 420.
189. Hague Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8-11.
190. Id. art. 7(g).
191. It should be noted that the United States has filed a reservation regarding financial
aid. See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
United States Reservations to Articles 24, 26, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=status.comment&csid=
652&disp=resdn (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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unable to accept responsibility over the child. Secondly, though the
child's wishes are normally raised by the abducting parent refusing re-
turn and not by the child, eventually courts are usually made aware and
take note of the child's wishes directly or indirectly, thereby hearing the
child's views. Nevertheless, the language of Article 13 of the Hague
Convention may be lacking on this point, and should formally indicate
that the child should be heard in a proceeding regarding return.
How can a court comply with the right of a child to be heard? It is
important, once again, to examine the exact language of Article 12(2) of
the CRC, which calls for the application of this right in judicial proceed-
ings "either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body,
in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law."'92 This
article allows a court applying the Hague Convention to consider the
views of the child not only by way of direct participation or through a
representative appointed for the child, but also through other bodies un-
der the procedures of that state. Hence, courts that tend to appoint social
workers or expert psychologists in order to assess the views of the child
are not acting against the clear meaning of Article 12, as some have sug-
gested, because the article does not negate the possibility of using these
methods to make the child's views known to the court. 93
Granted, appointing a representative for the child may be warranted
in certain situations. However, the list of issues provided by scholars that
warrant such an appointment would necessitate appointing a representa-
tive in practically every case where an order of return is contested by the
abductor. Such a solution is neither practical, due to limited resources
and time constraints,94 nor legally required under the CRC.
The language of Article 12 indicates that the methods of letting the
child voice his or her views are alternative methods, not cumulative.
Therefore, a court would not breach the article if it chose to hear the
child through a representative or an expert, without meeting with the
child directly. Here, of course, the time constraints when deliberating
return should urge the court to satisfy its assessment of the child's views
by choosing just one of the methods enumerated in Article 12.'9- These
constraints may also override the court's wish to hear the child in order
192. CRC, supra note 19, art. 12(2) (emphasis added).
193. See PARKINSON & CASHMORE, supra note 115, at 210 (discussing the various ways
that states apply generally to assess the views of the child and noting that a number of states
regularly do so indirectly); see also FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES, MATE-
RIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAw 423-24 (D.
Marianne Blair et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMU-
NITY].
194. In re M and another (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55,
[2008] 1 A.C. 1288 (H.L.), [57] (appeal taken from Eng.).
195. CRC, supra note 19, art. 12.
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to encourage his or her feelings of participation and acceptance, impor-
tant as they may be.
To this equation, it is necessary to add that courts must consider
whether the best interests of the child favor sparing the child from di-
rectly taking part in proceedings that may have a negative psychological
effect on the child.'" In such situations, a court may reasonably choose
to avoid hearing the child directly, keeping in mind that a children's ex-
pert is not necessarily any less competent than a judge in assessing the
child's views in light of the child's age and maturity, especially a very
197
young one.
In addition, though the child must be heard under the CRC, his or
her opinion is not determinative. In fact, this is what led Baroness Hale
of Richmond to the conclusion that appointment of "separate representa-
tion in all cases, even in all child's objections cases, might be to send
them the wrong messages."' 8 The language found in Article 13 of the
Hague Convention resembles that of Article 12(1) of the CRC. Whereas
in Article 12(1) of the CRC, the views of the child should be given "due
weight, in accordance with" his or her age and maturity, Article 13 of the
Hague Convention orders the court to "take account" of a child's objec-
tion to return if he or she is of appropriate "age and degree of
maturity."'" Schuz has opined that courts have taken too stringent an ap-
proach in assessing a child's age and maturity, to the effect that the
child's views are usually not a key factor. Linda Silberman and Nigel
Lowe, however, are wary of the jurisprudence of some courts that take
into account the views of children as young as eight years old, or even
four years old, while the drafters of the Hague Convention intended
courts to consider the views only of children just below the sixteen-year-
old age limit.2 00
Whatever the case may be, Article 12 of the CRC recognizes that the
age and maturity of a child affects the weight courts should give to the
child's views. For this reason, courts are right to be suspicious of chil-
dren unwilling to return to their place of habitual residence, especially
when it serves their best interests. In fact, such an opinion expressed by a
child could be considered as evidence of the child's immaturity and bad
196. PARKINSON & CASHMORE, supra note 115, at 195-96, 208-09.
197. Id. at 211-12, 215-16.
198. Id.
199. Compare CRC, supra note 19, art. 12(1) with Hague Convention, supra note 1, art.
13.
200. Silberman, Patching Up, supra note 132, at 56; LOWE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra
note 3, at 12.
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judgment.20' This point is emphasized by what Patrick Parkinson and
Judy Cashmore term the difference between "voice and choice," mean-
ing that the child's view is not decisive in a given legal dispute
concerning him or her.2m Rather, the right to be heard entails that the
child's views should be taken seriously-and that the child feels that his
or her views are important to the process-but the decision will be based
on all of the relevant information and the needs of those involved.203
Given the above analysis, a stringent approach to assessing the age
and maturity of a child not wanting to return would be within the
confines of Article 12 of the CRC. Moreover, as argued before, the
child's objection may also impact the right to family life that would be
enjoyed by returning to the place of residence. Therefore, courts would
be correct to deny return only when a mature child is of a firm and
strong opinion against return (though it should be stressed that the
child's views on the issue of custody are irrelevant at this juncture).
Another point argued was that defining a removal as "wrongful"
when the child is not opposed to it, is itself a breach of Article 12 of the
CRC. Such an assertion is ungrounded, as neither the views of the par-
ents nor the child are relevant to the definition. As Article 3(a) of the
Hague Convention makes clear, what renders the removal wrongful are
the laws of custody applicable in the place of the child's habitual resi-
dence. These objective laws are applied to assess the removal and
obligate all individuals under the jurisdiction of that state, regardless of
their opinion on the substantive issues of law.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the Hague Convention is an
international treaty that settles specific issues of jurisdiction-a matter
regularly determined by domestic legislation and rules of private interna-
tional law. This is done by deciding that the place of the child's habitual
residence-the forum conveniens-will resolve the matter of custody."4
Parents, as well as their children, are confounded by these laws on a
regular basis. Though it is true that a custody hearing may proceed in the
child's place of residence in absentia, this should be the exception and
not the rule, as it infringes on the child's best interests and his or her
right to be heard.
201. See PARKINSON & CASHMORE, supra note 115, at 201-02 (describing the connec-
tion between the child's age and maturity and his or her ability to assess their own best
interests).
202. Id. at 198-201. This is also reflected in the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights in C v. Finland, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 24, V 40, 54, 57, 58 (2008). See also FAMILY
LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY, supra note 193, at 424.
203. PARKINSON & CASHMORE, supra note 115, at 199.
204. INGLIS, supra note 11, at 542.
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d. Women's Rights and Children's Rights: Domestic Violence
As expressed earlier, some commentators are of the view that courts
should be more sympathetic toward abducting mothers alleging domestic
violence as a reason for denying a return. In an attempt to assess this
argument as a matter of principle, putting aside the highly contested
question of the effectiveness of undertakings and issues of factual find-
ings, 205 some further considerations should be illuminated.
First, it is important to remember that an order of return entails the
return of the child to the state of residence, but not necessarily to the fa-
ther's house or vicinity for that matter.2
Furthermore, it may be that denying the return of a child, in order to
allow him or her to stay with the mother (who wishes to stay where she
currently is for valid reasons), actually infringes on the rights of the
child. For example, in cases where the child is not an alleged victim of
abuse, and his or her best interests are served by returning to familiar
surroundings, a denial of return based on the condition of the mother is
in effect preferring the rights of one individual over that of the other.
Another example is when claims of domestic violence perpetrated
against the mother stand against the explicit wish of the child to return to
the place of habitual residence. Such was the issue in S v. S before the
High Court of New Zealand,20' a case of a physically and psychologically
abused wife who fled with her three children from Australia to New Zea-
land. The mother argued that the children were exposed to the abuse,
though not abused directly by the father, and should be kept away from
their father who may resort to abusing them in the future-an argument
accepted by the lower court.2 08 She also claimed that due to her mental
state, and lack of family support, she could no longer protect the children's
best interests in Australia.2" The children, however, forcefully expressed
their desire to return to Australia and expressed no fear of their father.210 In
light of the explicit wishes of the children, the High Court reversed the
earlier decision of the Family Court and ordered the return of the children
to Australia.2 11 The Court of Appeal later affirmed the decision and reason-
ing of the High Court.2 12 Whatever the right decision was in that case, it
205. See Caldwell, supra note 83 (reaching the conclusion that these arguments essen-
tially concern the fact finding assessments of courts and not legal analysis).
206. Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(a).
207. S v. S, [1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. 513 (H.C.) (N.Z.). For an analysis of this case see INGLIS,
supra note II, at 605-08.
208. S v. S, [1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 516, 1 29-40.
209. Id. at 524, 1 21-28.
210. Id. at 526, n 1-4.
211. Id. at 527, 11 35-36.
212. Id. at 536.
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demonstrates that taking into account the rights of the abducting mother
in such cases does not always go hand-in-hand with the best interests of
her child or with the duty to consider the child's views. Thus, in certain
cases, protecting the rights of the mother, important as they may be, ne-
gates not only the objects and purposes of the Hague Convention, but the
rights of the child under the CRC as well.
This also inevitably infringes on the rights of the left-behind par-
ent." Indeed, many jurisdictions apply a presumption that a spouse-
abusing parent is unfit to retain custody of a joint child.2 14 Yet, as with
any presumption, the abuser can overturn it and prove that he is still fit to
parent, and therefore has not forfeited his custody rights by abusing his
spouse. Hence, even a spouse-abusing parent has the right to custody
over his child, unless otherwise determined by a court that is capable of
fully assessing the relationship among both parents and the child; mean-
ing, in other words, a court in the place of habitual residence.215
As for assessing the effectiveness of other legal systems, it would be
hard to request a foreign court to perform an in-depth analysis of the capa-
bilities of the legal system in the place of habitual residence to protect a
mother and a child from an abusive parent in every given case. As the use
of undertakings has become more frequent-at least in common law juris-
dictions-courts inevitably pass judgment on the measures available for
the protection of women and children in the place of habitual residence,
prior to a decision denying return.2 6 On the one hand, this might encour-
age states to improve their internal capabilities to protect endangered
women; such actions may eventually negate the incentive for international
child abduction in cases of domestic violence. On the other hand, by doing
so, courts risk the possibility that the authorities in the state of residence
will be found inadequate to ensure the safety of those under its jurisdic-
tion, thus jeopardizing international comity and notions of reciprocity
between jurisdictions.2 17 Such a conclusion in turn, may invite a retalia-
213. See supra Part II.B.2.
214. Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for
Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 749, 751-55 (2003); NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
supra note 54, at 9-10.
215. Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kid-
napping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
49, 84 (2008).
216. Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 67, 227; see also Walsh v. Walsh, 221
F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing the potential benefits and problems with undertak-
ings). For an example of the need to assess the efficiency of other jurisdictions, see Blondin v.
Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1999); Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 969 (Conn.
2000).
217. INGLIs, supra note 11, at 541; LOWE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 11;
Nelson, supra note 97, at 691-93; Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and Failures
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tory anti-return decision by the courts in that state when deliberating a
return to the former state in future cases, thus endangering the function-
ing of the Hague Convention.m
As discussed above, though comity among member states is only a
subsidiary consideration when balanced against the best interests of the
child or the protection of the abducting parent, it is imperative to the ef-
fectiveness of the Hague Convention. Seeing as comity serves as the
backbone behind the Hague Convention's effectiveness, other considera-
tions should rarely allow for courts to pass judgment on the worthiness
of foreign legal systems. Therefore, it is essential that courts considering
return act under the presumption that the courts in the place of habitual
residence are capable and willing to protect those that fall under their
jurisdiction and reduce any existing risk, unless proven otherwise in the
specific facts of that case.219
It should be kept in mind that in practice, no system is entirely suc-
cessful at protecting those under its jurisdiction. Though the legal
systems in one state might generally be more effective than those in
another, certainty is never guaranteed, and all systems have their faults.
Therefore, a reasonably well-functioning legal system should be as-
sumed to be able to guarantee the safety of those who come before it
alleging physical and psychological abuse. To avoid superficial assess-
ments of the effectiveness of other legal systems, courts cannot be
expected to go further than a prima facie analysis of the capabilities of
other legal systems to provide for adequate protection to children and
mothers returning to the place of habitual residence. Only in rare cir-
cumstances, as stated by Lord Donaldson, should a court find that the
of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in the
United States and Germany, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 285, 329-30 (2000).
218. Blondin, 189 F.3d at 248-49; Turner, 752 A.2d at 972-73; W. Michael Reisman,
Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties, 15 YALE. J. INT'L L. 316,
323 (1990); see also Steffen v. Severina, 966 F. Supp. 922, 927 (D. Ariz. 1997) (providing an
example of how courts look for and rely on "mirror" cases in the jurisprudence of the courts in
the place of habitual residence); Nelson, supra note 97, at 682.
219. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 149 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting);
Blondin, 189 F.3d at 248-49; Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996). This
very notion was stated accurately by Lord Donaldson of the English Court of Appeals:
It will be the concern of the court of the State to which the child is to be returned to
minimize or eliminate this harm and, in the absence of compelling evidence to the
contrary or evidence that is beyond the powers of those courts in the circumstances
of the case, the courts of this country should assume that this will be done.
C v. C (Minor: Abduction: Rights of Custody Abroad), [1989] 1 WLR 654, 664 (A.C.) (Austl.)
(as reiterated in In re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Psychological Harm) [1999] 1 F.L.R. 1145
(A.C.)).
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power of the courts in the place of habitual residence are insufficient to
protect the child or the parent.220
The views expressed above do not imply that courts should not be
sensitive and responsive to claims of domestic violence put forward by
mothers who have abducted their child to another state. They simply
stress that such considerations have differing consequences on the inter-
ests and rights of the abducted child. For this reason, it might be correct
to assert that the best way to protect the rights of the child is to allow
only a narrow consideration of such allegations and deny return only
when it has been demonstrated that the child will be exposed to a "grave
risk" upon return, or that the legal system in the child's place of resi-
dence is clearly incapable of protecting the child upon return.
e. Effective Mechanisms to Counter International Abductions
Finally, a general point relating to the child's rights under the CRC
should be made. Though the mere existence of Articles 11 and 35 of the
CRC does not render moot the need to reconcile human rights and the
Hague Convention, it does account for an obligation upon states to con-
clude agreements that provide for effective mechanisms to counter
international child abductions. This may imply, firstly, that a party to the
CRC has an obligation toward a specific child before its courts to pro-
vide him or her with a remedy against his or her abduction. In addition,
it may oblige the state to maintain the effectiveness of the Hague Con-
vention in general-a goal understood to be achieved by a presumption
of return-so as to provide "appropriate . . . measures" 22' against child
abduction ex ante, as the CRC itself requires of state parties. And so, the
existence of these two articles in the CRC should be added to the balanc-
ing of a child's rights and push the equilibrium toward an order of return.
The analysis above demonstrates that certain human rights consid-
erations are lacking from the arguments made against the conformity of
the Hague Convention with the CRC. Adding these considerations to the
delicate balancing of rights involved in abduction cases leads to the con-
clusion that the Hague Convention, as traditionally applied by courts,
and as a matter of principle, 22  does not violate the rights enumerated in
the CRC.
220. See C v. C, [1989] 1 WLR at 664; see also Croll, 229 F.3d at 149 n.4; Blondin, 189
F.3d at 248-49; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068. For an example of such a case where the legal
system of the place of residence was deemed insufficient to protect the child from the father's
violent tendencies, see Walsh, 221 F.3d at 221.
221. CRC, supra note 19, art. 35.
222. The exception being a lack of formal mention that a child should always be heard
directly or indirectly. See Section II.A.3.
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III. RETURN AND THE PARTICULAR RIGHTS OF
ABDUCTED CHILDREN AS A GROUP
The arguments and counterclaims put forward in Part II demonstrate
the key issues that must be taken into account in cases of child abduc-
tion. All would agree that time is of the essence when deliberating the
return of a child.2 On the other hand, to conduct a true legal analysis of
all the child's relevant rights and their proper weight and interplay with
one another-an analysis that must also rely on the proper compilation
and assessment of factual evidence in order to fully assess the best inter-
ests of the child-is anything but an uncomplicated and swift process.
If a court chooses to analyze the best interests of the child, after appoint-
ing the child a separate representative, hearing his or her opinion
directly, and assessing all other relevant rights, including those pertain-
ing to an abducting mother alleging violence in some cases, it could
hardly do so in swift and prompt proceedings as called for by the Hague
Convention.225 It is this result of prolonged deliberation, and its effect on
a definitive group of children, that will be the focus of this Part.
As discussed above, Article 3 of the CRC encompasses both a "gen-
eral" scope, allowing for the consideration of the best interests of
children whenever those are affected in the broad sense, and an "individ-
ual" scope (i.e., the obligation to consider the best interests of the
particular child standing before a court of law).226 As further discussed
above, both of these dimensions of the best interests principle come into
play in decisions regarding return and the balance between the various
relevant considerations.227 Yet, between the interests of one child and
those of children in general, lay the interests of a substantial group of
children in need of special protection-these are the children actually
abducted every year, to whom the Hague Convention also applies.
Statistical reports conducted for the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law provide a rough estimate of the number of children that
make up this group. 228 This statistical analysis examined applications for
223. In re M and another (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody), [2007] UKHL 55,
[20081 1 A.C. 1288 (H.L.), [42] (appeal taken from Eng.); INGLIS, supra note 11, at 537, 547-
49; LOWE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 19; Schuz, supra note 55, at 399-400.
224. See Silberman, Patching Up, supra note 132, at 53 (arguing that the "traumatic
stress disorder" standard can transform a summary Hague proceeding into a full custody hear-
ing); see also Silberman, Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 174, at 239
(demonstrating that inquiring into the long-term best interests of the child is a lengthy process
and essentially similar to a full custody hearing).
225. In re M and another, [2007] UKHL 55 at [42]; Hague Convention, supra note 1,
pmbl.; INGLIS, supra note 11, at 537, 547-49; Schuz, supra note 55, at 399-400.
226. See supra Part H.B.
227. See supra Part H.B.2.
228. LOWE ET AL., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 21.
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return filed before or by Central Authorities in member states during the
years 1999 and 2003. In 1999, roughly 1060 such applications were
filed. This number rose to 1355 in 2003.229 The surveyed applications in
1999 and 2003 involved up to 2030 and 2211 children respectively. 23 0
These figures do not account for applications of return filed directly by
left-behind parents in the courts of the member states, suggesting that the
number of applications for the return of children abducted across mem-
ber states' borders is actually higher.23 ' Nevertheless, for the purposes of
the argument advanced in this Part, this last figure of 2211 children can
be assumed to represent-albeit roughly-the number of children ab-
ducted across international borders who will be subjected each year to
proceedings of return under the Hague Convention.232
The best interests of these 2211 children will be affected for the
worse if the question of return under the Hague Convention becomes a
full-scale examination of a single child's best interests, thus denying the
entirety of the group a prompt, quick, and timely return to their place of
residence following an obstructive abduction. This group of children's
best interests should be considered as a "whole" and as a "primary con-
sideration" every time the best interests of a particular child facing return
are considered. In the event that the individual's best interests are served
by a denial of return, the interests of these 2211 children could neverthe-
less justify a return under the CRC, in order to maintain the effectiveness
of the Hague Convention regime, alongside the other relevant considera-
tions discussed in the previous Part.
Furthermore, on the normative level, before concluding that the ex-
ceptions to return found in the Hague Convention should be expanded in
order to comply with human rights, one must consider the counterweight
that the interest of these 2211 children in a swift return carries. Consider-
ing these children as a definitive group bearing rights, the decision to
return becomes a situation of conflicting interests between many chil-
dren, rather than a conflict between one child and some abstract and
perhaps less weighty notion of children's interests in general. Indeed, the
drafters of Article 3 of the CRC were aware that, at times, serving the
best interests of one child will inevitably come at the expense of the best
interests of another child.233
Moreover, according to Freeman, Article 3(2) of the CRC operates
as a "backstop provision," meant to protect categories of children ne-
229. Id. at 10-11. Note that the increase in applications is also a result of an increase of
Parties to the Hague Convention itself.
230. Id. at 11.
231. Id.
232. Note that one can add access requests under the Hague Convention to this figure.
233. Freeman, supra note 72, at 62-64.
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glected by the CRC. 23 Freeman's examples of such vulnerable groups-
such as gay or street children-present different questions for the parties
to the CRC than the issue at hand.235 Nevertheless, children abducted
across international borders are put in a unique and possibly destructive
236
situation, and are therefore in need of special consideration and recog-
nition when assessing their best interests. Consequently, the best
interests of the group of children exposed to child abduction every year
are of considerable weight, not only based on the merits of each child
composing the group, but also based on the entirety of this group of
children as such.
Therefore, taking the interests of the defined group of abducted chil-
dren in a prompt and effective mechanism for return into account as a
"primary consideration,"" enhances the conclusion reached in the previ-
ous Part: The narrow scope of the exception to return in the Hague
Convention should not be expanded-consequently impairing the
promptness and effectiveness of the mechanism-in order to better serve
the best interests of approximately 2200 children directly affected by the
* * *238
mechanism in a given year.
CONCLUSION
In the difficult case presented in the introduction, the trial judge con-
cluded that separating the six-year-old boy from his big sister, and
possibly from his mother, would cause him serious psychological harm,
and therefore he should not be returned to Cyprus."9 The Court of
Appeal reversed the decision and ordered the younger brother returned
to Cyprus, where his father lived.m Keeping in mind that a stringent test
should be applied when finding that the return will expose the child to a
grave risk, the court was of the view that the trial judge over-emphasized
the consequences of returning the child to Cyprus in favor of the older
sister and the mother. The Court of Appeal found that these latter conse-
quences should not deflect the right of the brother "to have his future
decided in the State of his habitual residence. Although his mother is
234. Id. at 66.
235. Id. at 66-67.
236. LOWE, INT'L FORUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
237. CRC, supra note 19, art. 3(1).
238. LOWE ET AL., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 11.
239. In re C (Abduction: Grave Risk of Physical or Psychological Harm), [1999] 2
F.L.R. 478 (A.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
240. Id.
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English, he is a Greek-speaking Cypriot boy brought up in Cyprus with a
paternal as well as maternal family."24'
One can agree or disagree with the conclusions of the Court of Ap-
peal. Still, it seems that the Court of Appeal's final judgment is more in
line with the narrow application of the exceptions of return advocated for
in this Article, and the considerations supporting that position.
In any case, any decision reached by the Court of Appeal would have
impinged on the wishes and rights of at least one of the individuals in-
volved in the abduction, be it the mother, the father, or either child.
Indeed, this was demonstrated in another case involving the possible
separation of brothers before the Supreme Court of Israel.2 4 ' After con-
cluding that the older brother must return to his place of habitual
residence in France, even if the mother opts to stay behind with her new-
born infant, Justice Joubran made the following remarks:
[T]his case, as [are] many cases brought under the Hague Con-
vention, is a difficult one, as the Court is faced with hard
questions, and must decide between two possibilities, each prob-
lematic in its own way. Such cases are a reminder that the law is
limited by its nature, and that the welfare of the two brothers in
this case is first and foremost in the hands of their parents and
the latter's ability to provide for an arrangement that will better
their children as much as possible, while the parents undergo di-
vorce proceedings. Nevertheless, as this Court is called upon to
adjudicate the case in hand, it seems that returning the older
brother to France for now is the lesser of two evils, under the as-
sumption that the French courts will assess the child's best
interests and other rights in their full scope, when ultimately de-
243
ciding upon the custody dispute between the parents.
Inevitably, behind every proceeding under the Hague Convention lay
the hardship of a torn family. Hopefully, enhancing the effectiveness of
the Hague Convention regime, which does give due weight to human
rights considerations, will succeed in deterring parents from child abduc-
tion in the future.
241. Id.
242. CA 2338/09 Plonit v. Ploni (June 3, 2009) (Isr.), available at http://
elyonl.court.gov.il/files/09/380/023/hl2/09023380.hl2.pdf; see supra Part II.B.I.
243. Id. 135.
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